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EVALUATING UNIONS: LABOR ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 
Michael J. Goldberg* 
WHAT Do UNIONS Do?. By Richard B. Freeman and James L. 
Medoff. New York: Basic Books. 1984. Pp. x, 293. $22.95. 
The National Labor Relations Act1 celebrated its fiftieth anniver-
sary last year, and that milestone was marked by renewed speculation 
about the future of the labor movement in this country. In terms of 
relative size and influence, American unions have been in a state of 
chronic decline for almost thirty years, and many people wonder 
whether they are worth saving. What Do Unions Do?, an outstanding 
empirical analysis of the role of unions in the American economy by 
Harvard economists Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff,2 sug-
gests that they are. 
In reaching that conclusion, the authors ma.lee no effort to mini-
mize the fact that recent times have been hard times for most unions. 
For example, the percentage of private sector nonagricultural workers 
represented by unions dropped from thirty-four percent in 1956 to 
about twenty-four percent in 1980 (p. 221).3 Union victories in Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections have 
also fallen sharply, from a victory rate of sixty-five to seventy-five per-
cent in the 1950s to about forty-five percent in the early 1980s (pp. 
221-22). Not surprisingly, unions have suffered a commensurate loss 
of political influence. In 1977 and 1978, for instance, the labor move-
ment was unable to secure passage of a relatively modest Labor Law 
• Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1971, Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1977, Georgetown University Law Center. - Ed. I 
would like to thank Roger J. Dennis and Lea VanderVelde for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1. The Act, as amended, is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). 
2. Freeman is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Director of Labor Re-
search at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Medoff is also on the economics faculty at 
Harvard and is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
3. Unfortunately, I found Freeman and Medoff's discussion of the percentage of the 
workforce represented by unions to be uncharacteristically imprecise. They cite figures for per-
centages of workers "organized" without specifying whether they mean workers who are repre· 
sented by unions or the somewhat smaller percentage of workers who actually belong to unions. 
Nevertheless, the authors are quite correct that union strength, however measured, has drasti-
cally declined. According to the Bureau of National Affairs, the percentage of the civilian 
workforce who are union members dropped from about 30% in 1950 to 20.9% in 1980 and then 
to "a new, modem-era low of 17.9% in 1982." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNIONS TO-
DAY: NEW TACTICS TO TACKLE TOUGH TIMES 7 (1985). 
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Reform Bill4 in spite of the fact that the Democratic Party controlled 
the White House and both houses of Congress (pp. 202-04). 
The scope of this book, however, goes far beyond its documenta-
tion of what the authors call "the slow strangulation of private-sector 
unions" (p. 221). The book's purpose is to paint "a new portrait of 
U.S. unionism" (p. 3) based on the analysis of an enormous wealth of 
economic data drawn from both the authors' own extensive research 
and that of dozens of other scholars in labor economics. The result of 
Freeman and Medoff's efforts is the most important and comprehen-
sive treatment of the economics of trade unions to appear in over 
twenty years. 5 
What Do Unions Do? has already made quite a splash in the indus-
trial relations community6 and warrants the attention of the legal 
community as well. In labor law as much as or more than any other 
field of law, it is crucial that policymakers root their decisions in the 
economic realities of industrial life.7 There is a danger, however, that 
the legal community will allow this essential integration of labor eco-
nomics and labor law to be shaped and dominated by the conservative, 
laissez-faire approach associated with the law and economics move-
ment. 8 What Do Unions Do?, with its basically positive picture of the 
labor movement's role in our economy and its call for more, not less, 
governmental protection for the organizing and collective bargaining 
activities of unions, can play an important role in reducing that dan-
ger. Indeed, that role will undoubtedly be enhanced by the book's 
readable style, which makes it accessible to a broad audience without 
extensive background in either economics or labor relations. 
This review will be in three parts. The first will present a descrip-
tion and evaluation of the book's principal argument, that unions per-
form a positive role in our economy that at a minimum cancels out, 
and probably even outweighs, their negative effects. The second part 
4. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See gener· 
ally Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1979). 
5. Among Freeman and Medoff's leading precursors are H.G. LEWIS, UNIONISM AND REL· 
ATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (1963), and A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UN· 
IONS (1962 & rev. ed. 1977). 
6. See, e.g., Review Symposium-What Do Unions Do? by Richard B. Freeman and James L. 
Medoff, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 244 (1985). The book was also the subject of a recent 
panel discussion at the 38th annual meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association. 
7. As Justice Goldberg once wrote: 
[I]n ... fashioning ... a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost importance 
that the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining 
process. We should not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts will be equally well 
adapted to the collective bargaining process. 
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also De!Costello v. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). 
8. E.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor 
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 988 (1984). 
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of this review will focus on some of the book's weaknesses, particularly 
its superficial chapter dealing with union democracy and union cor-
ruption. The review will conclude with a discussion of the book's im-
plications for contemporary labor law scholarship. 
I 
The overriding theme of What Do Unions Do? is that unions have 
two "faces," one bad and one good: "a monopoly !ace, associated with 
[unions'] monopolistic power to raise wages; and a collective voice/in-
stitutional response face, associated with their representation of organ-. 
ized workers within enterprises."9 The authors concede that to the 
extent unions operate as monopoly institutions10 they can harm a capi-
talistic economy in several ways: 
First, union-won wage increases cause a misallocation of resources by 
inducing organized firms to hire fewer workers, to use more capital per 
worker, and to hire workers of higher quality than is socially optimal. 
Second, strikes called to force management to accept union demands re-
duce gross national product. Third, union contract provisions - such as 
limits on the loads that can be handled by workers, restrictions on tasks 
performed, and featherbedding - lower the productivity of labor and 
capital. [p. 14] 
On the other hand, the collective voice face of unionism can actu-
ally enhance the productivity of enterprises. For example, collectively 
bargained seniority rules and grievance procedures have the effect of 
reducing quit rates and thereby lowering hiring and training costs (pp. 
104-07).11 The presence of unions also puts pressure on management 
to organize production more efficiently in order to preserve profits in 
the face of higher wages. And apart from their economic role, unions 
provide an important political voice for working people that makes 
our political process somewhat more democratic (pp. 15, 18). 
But which face predominates? Are critics of the labor movement 
correct that the inefficiencies and lowered profit margins associated 
with the labor movement's monopoly face make unions costly and un-
necessary relics of an earlier era? Or do the benefits associated with 
9. Pp. 5-6 (emphasis in original). Freeman and Medoff credit A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, 
AND LoYALTY (1971), as an inspiration for their analysis of the union movement's collective 
voice face. P. 7. 
10. They note, however, that "unions are not the simple monopolies of economics textbooks 
••. whose sole goal is to maximize profits, regardless of what happens to the number of units 
sold." P. 6 (footnote omitted). After all, unions often moderate their wage demands to preserve 
jobs. Moreover, unions are often strongest in industries where unionized firms already operate in 
a noncompetitive market. Where markets are competitive, unions have much less power to ex-
tract monopoly wage gains. P. 7. 
11. Union-induced wage increases, of course, also contribute to lower quit rates, so Freeman 
and Medoff factored out wage levels in order to determine the extent to which the collective voice 
face alone reduces employee turnover costs. P. 95. 
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unions' collective voice face reach sufficiently beyond the shrinking 
membership of the labor movement to outweigh the costs? 
Freeman and Medoff's answer is that the economic costs and bene-
fits of unionism roughly cancel each other out. They estimate that 
"union monopoly wage gains cost the economy 0.2 to 0.4 percent of 
gross national product, which in 1980 amounted to about ... $20.00 
to $40.00 per person" (p. 57). The benefits of lower turnover rates 
among unionized employees resulting from unionism's collective voice 
face, on the other hand, lower employer costs by one to two percent 
(p. 109)12 and constitute a benefit to unionized employees that trans-
lates into a 0.2 to 0.3% annual increase in the gross national product, 
or $20.00 to $30.00 per person - nearly the equivalent of the costs 
imposed by the monopoly face (p. 110). 
Moreover, Freeman and Medoff present a persuasive case that the 
benefits of unionism reach far beyond the ranks of organized workers. 
Their findings indicate, for example, that when some workers in a firm 
obtain higher wages and benefits through unionization, management 
tends to extend similar increases to its nonunion employees (p. 151). 
This finding is particularly significant because "while only 20 percent 
of the U.S. work force has joined a union, more than 50 percent work 
for companies that deal with unions" (p. 34). In addition, many large 
nonunion firms seek to avoid unionization by paying higher wages and 
offering more fringe benefits than they otherwise would. The authors 
estimate these increases to be as great as ten to twenty percent (p. 
153). Even failed union organizing drives frequently result in wage 
and benefit increases for the target employees (p. 155), although these 
increases are presumably smaller than those that would have accom-
panied unionization. 
Nevertheless, conservative economists often assert that unions 
achieve high wages for their members at the expense of lower-paid 
nonunion workers, suggesting that unions are not the egalitarian force 
they claim to be. 13 Freeman and Medoff concede that the wages of 
some workers are raised at the expense of other workers, but they ar-
gue that this increase in inequality "is dwarfed" by a number of other 
union wage effects that reduce inequality. Their studies demonstrate, 
for example, that union wage policies (1) reduce inequality of wages 
within enterprises;14 (2) promote equal pay for equal work across en-
terprises; and (3) reduce the wage gap between white-collar and blue-
12. The authors acknowledge, however, that these savings to employers are smaller than the 
upward effect unions have on wages, thus "guaranteeing that firms will not invite organization to 
enjoy the benefits of lower turnover." Pp. 109-10. 
13. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 124 (1962), 
quoted by Freeman & Medoff at p. 16. 
14. Unfortunately, the authors do not address the recent trend in many industries toward 
collective bargaining agreements providing for "two-tiered" wage plans. See Note, Tivo-Tier 
Wage Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 631, 632-35 (1985). 
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collar workers (p. 78). When these effects are factored into the equa-
tion, the evidence indicates that unions reduce wage inequality by 
about three percent overall (pp. 90-93). 
These and many other findings in What Do Unions Do? were gen-
erated by the authors' extensive computer-assisted analyses of a wealth 
of raw data collected mostly by others, such as the Census Bureau and 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.15 Although labor economists have 
been using similar data for years to examine unions' effects on wages, 
:f'.reeman and Medoff are among the first to attempt to quantify the 
nonwage effects of unions in order to evaluate unionism's collective 
voice face (p. 23). 
One of the book's great strengths is the authors' candid acknowl-
edgment of the limits of their discipline's methodology. They claim no 
ability to generate controlled experiments with their data that would 
permit them to alter one factor while holding all else constant (pp. 23, 
44-45). They are careful to qualify their findings when appropriate . 
and they freely admit when the data (or their modes of analysis) are 
simply insufficient to yield meaningful answers to some of their inquir-
ies.16 Moreover, they repeatedly test their findings against those of 
other economists who may have used different models, data, or statis-
tical procedures, explaining that "[i]n the social sciences, it is not exact 
duplication of 'experiments' that confirms a finding, but rather similar-
ity of findings under different specifications" (p. 98). Freeman and 
Medoff's refreshing pragmatism contributes greatly to their work's 
overall credibility.11 
A common feature of many empirical studies is that much of what 
they prove is the intuitively obvious, and this is certainly true of some 
of Freeman and Medoff's findings. For example, they confirm one of 
the labor movement's most basic assumptions, that the larger the pro-
portion of workers that is organized in a particular market, the greater 
the impact on wages the union is likely to have (p. 51). Another pre-
dictable finding is that unions are more likely to make wage conces-
sions when existing wage packages threaten the employment of 
substantial numbers of union members (p. 56). 
But empirical research has its greatest impact when it disproves -
or at least calls into question - poorly documented but commonly 
15. The book's appendix provides a description of the fourteen data sources most heavily 
relied upon. Pp. 253-59. 
16. For example, they concede their inability to resolve the debate over the relationship be-
tween the union wage differential and the product market power of employers. P. 52. Similarly, 
they offer a "guess" that union seniority rules, from an economic standpoint, are on balance 
socially beneficial, but they acknowledge that the quantitative evidence is inconclusive. P. 134. 
17. In a good example of Freeman and Medofrs nondogmatic approach, they describe two 
competing methods of measuring company or industry profitability and then report that they 
examined the effects of unionism on both, "on the principle that when one cannot measure the 
theoretically correct concept, one does better to look at several indicators, rather than to debate 
over which imperfect indicator is 'best.'" P. 182. 
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held beliefs. What Do Unions Do? accomplishes this on numerous oc-
casions. For example, it is commonly assumed that union wage gains 
are a major cause of inflation, but Freeman and Medoff demonstrate 
that union wage increases accounted for only "a minuscule share" of 
the inflation between 1975 and 1981 (pp. 58-59). 18 They are careful 
not to overstate their conclusion, however, noting that to the degree 
nonunion employers emulate union wage patterns, unions are indi-
rectly responsible for some of the inflationary pressures generated in 
the nonunion sector (p. 59). 
By the authors' own admission, the most controversial - and, to 
some commentators, the most counterintuitive19 - of their conclu-
sions is one noted earlier,20 that productivity is frequently higher in 
unionized establishments than in otherwise comparable nonunion es-
tablishments (p. 180). And, as the authors anticipated, a number of 
commentators have criticized either the methodology or the volume of 
data relied upon to reach that conclusion.21 
Not being an economist, I am reluctant to enter that fray, but there 
is one factor that both Freeman and Medoff and their critics seem to 
have overlooked, which could lend some support to Freeman and 
Medoff's position. That factor is the role unions must play, given the 
constraints of modern labor law,22 in maintaining production by 
preventing wildcat strikes and slowdowns and by otherwise helping to 
maintain a disciplined workforce. As the Senate committee report on 
18. According to the authors' calculations, union wage gains added only "2.3 percentage 
points of inflation to the observed 68-point increase in the GNP deflator" during that period. P. 
59. 
19. E.g .. Posner, supra note 8, at 1000-01 (commenting on Freeman and Medoff articles that 
first reported many of the conclusions later incorporated into What Do Ulliolls Do?). 
20. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
21. E.g .. Ashenfelter, Book Review, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (1985); Hirsch, Book 
Review, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 247 (1985); Mitchell, Book Review, 38 INDUS. & LAD. 
REL. REV. 253 (1985). 
22. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 
(1975) (concerted activity by minority employees unprotected if undertaken outside contractual 
grievance procedure); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) 
(grievance strike in violation of no-strike clause may be enjoined); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 
370 U.S. 238 (1962) (union that authorizes or participates in strike in breach of no-strike clause 
may be liable for damages); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.', 369 U.S. 95 {1962) (no-
strike clause will be implied where contract provides for grievance arbitration); Elk Lumber Co., 
91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (work slowdown an unprotected activity under the NLRA); Ford Motor 
Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.) (employees must obey even unauthorized 
employer commands pending completion of grievance process - "obey now, grieve later"), See 
gellera/ly J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW {1983); Klare, 
Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
65 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Lynd, The Right to Ellgage ill Collcerted Activity After UlliOll Recoglli· 
tioll: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm ill 
American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). For a discussion of the effects of these con-
straints on a Teamsters local with a militant and surprisingly democratic history, see S. FRIED· 
MAN, TEAMSTER RANK AND FILE: POWER, BUREAUCRACY, AND REBELLION AT WORK AND 
IN A UNION (1982). 
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the Taft-Hartley Act23 put it, "The chief advantage which an em-
ployer can reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is as-
surance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the 
agreement. "24 
The long and often violent history of labor protest in this country 
demonstrates that even without unions and without the protection of 
federal labor law, aggrieved workers will often strike or otherwise dis-
rupt production in efforts to resolve their grievances and obtain more 
control over their workplaces.25 Thus, the role of modern unions in 
curtailing those disruptions must be examined before a complete eval-
uation of their effect on productivity can be made.26 Unfortunately, 
any effort to quantify that role would necessarily be speculative; sim-
ply comparing contemporary strike costs between the union and non-
union sectors would not provide reliable data, because those sectors 
which are now heavily unionized may have become unionized pre-
cisely because their potential for disruption was great. 27 
II 
Overall, I found the economic analysis presented in What Do Un-
ions Do? to be exhaustive, persuasive, and - perhaps most important 
for noneconomists - comprehensible. Unfortunately, when the au-
thors venture beyond economics into labor law, their work is less satis-
factory. For example, they correctly point out that a major factor 
contributing to the decline of the labor movement in this country is 
the National Labor Relations Act's inability to deter wholesale viola-
tions of the Act by companies seeking to defeat union organizing ef-
forts (pp. 230-43). To make this point, however, they slightly 
overstate their case by mistakenly assuming that all workers illegally 
fired for union activity are fired during or shortly after organizational 
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982)). · · 
24. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 422 (1948). See generally 
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 764-71 
(1973). 
25. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER, 1933-1941 (1970); J. BRECHER, STRIKE! (1972). 
26. Of course, the savings resulting from the role of unions in preventing disruptions must be 
reduced by the costs imposed by strikes called by unions. One critic faulted Freeman and Medoff 
for failing to give sufficient weight to the costs of union-called strikes, but he too overlooked the 
savings resulting from the prevention of disruptions that might have occurred without the union 
presence. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 255 n.11. 
27. Cf. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 96-175 (1977) (analyzing 
the importance of violent labor protests in the trucking, longshore, auto parts, and other now 
heavily unionized industries in bringing about the passage of the National Labor Relations Act); 
Leigh, Risk Preference and the Interindustry Propensity to Strike, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 
271 (1983) (industries with high injury rates - such as the heavily unionized mining and con-
struction industries - experience a disproportionate number of strikes). 
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campaigns (pp. 232-33).28 
Similarly, the book treats rather superficially the argument that 
collectively bargained seniority systems often have a discriminatory 
impact on women and minorities.29 According to Freeman and 
Medoff, black male blue-collar workers have an average of one year 
less seniority than their white counterparts, suggesting some disadvan-
tage, but black women have nearly one year more seniority than white 
women, implying some advantage. These and other figures lead the 
authors to conclude that "[t]he charge that seniority is injurious to 
minority economic interests is wrong, because large numbers of minor-
ity workers have accrued sufficient seniority to be its beneficiaries" (p. 
135). These findings are certainly encouraging, but they are incom-
plete. They ignore the fact that the jobs in which all too many women 
and minorities accumulate that seniority are at the bottom of the eco-
nomic ladder, 30 and that restrictive interpretations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196431 permit the operation of many seniority sys-
tems proven to effectively limit minority and female access to, or ten-
ure in, more desirable jobs. 32 
Freeman and Medoff's examination of the problems of corruption 
and undemocratic practices in the labor movement is even more unsat-
isfactory. I have no doubt that the conclusions they ultimately reach 
28. Freeman and Medoff appear to have borrowed much of their analysis of the NLRA from 
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983), cited by Freeman & Medoff at p. 282 n.12 [hereinafter cited as 
Weiler, Promises to Keep], but they fail to note Weiler's reference to NLRB figures indicating 
that approximately 10% of the discharges in violation of the Act were unrelated to union or-
ganizing efforts. Id. at 1781 n.35. In a more recent article, Weiler cites a General Accounting 
Office study indicating that as many as forty percent of the NLRB's discriminatory discharge 
complaints were unrelated to union organizing campaigns. Weiler, Striking A New Balance: 
Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 356 
n.13 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Weiler, Striking a New Balance]. 
29. See, e.g., w. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977); U.S. COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1977). This criticism 
is not meant to deny or minimize the important fact that unionization has shown some tendency 
to reduce wage disparities between black and white workers, and between male and female work-
ers. Pp. 48-50. 
30. For example, in the generally higher-paying precision production, craft, and repair occu-
pations, blacks hold 7.2% of the jobs and women hold 8.5%. In lower-paying operator, 
fabricator, and laborer occupations, however, blacks hold 14.3% of the jobs and women hold 
26%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 
178, 179 (Jan. 1985). Similarly, in the health care field, blacks hold only 7.6% of the registered 
nurse jobs but 29% of the nursing aid, orderly, and attendant positions. Id. at 176, 178. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). 
32. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (a seniority 
system adopted without the intent to discriminate does not violate Title VII even if it perpetuates 
the effects of pre-Act discrimination); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) 
(protection of Teamsters decision extended to seniority systems adopted after effective date of 
Title VII); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (court may not 
modify Title VII consent decree to override operation of seniority system that results in dis pro· 
portionate layoffs of minority workers recently hired pursuant to decree•s affirmative action 
provisions). 
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are valid: that "[t]here is a great deal of democracy ... throughout 
the labor movement" and that "the amount of union corruption is no 
more than, and probably less than, business corruption" (p. 220). But 
this should not be to deny that there are still frequent and serious cases 
of autocratic and corrupt rule that affect hundreds of thousands of 
union members.33 Unfortunately, the authors' analysis seems to do 
just that, by presenting the reader with a superficial and unjustifiably 
rosy picture of the internal affairs of American unions. 
For example, Freeman and Medoff correctly report that ''judicial 
decisions obligate unions to represent all members fairly" (p. 208), but 
they fail to note that in collective bargaining, those decisions give un-
ions almost unlimited discretion to allocate benefits among different 
groups of workers, so long as choices are not based on such invidious 
criteria as race or sex.34 In grievance handling, the union's duty of fair 
representation is ostensibly more demanding, 35 but my own empirical 
research has confirmed the suspicions of a number of commentators36 
that the duty "is little more than an empty promise which ultimately 
fails to provide workers with meaningful protection from arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or perfunctory union conduct."37 
The authors are aware, of course, that paper promises of fair and 
democratic treatment, whether contained in statutes, judicial prece-
dents, or union constitutions, do not necessarily guarantee that such 
treatment will be delivered (pp. 207-08). Accordingly, they report 
other evidence of union democracy, such as survey data indicating rea-
sonably favorable opinions of unions by their members and surpris-
ingly high levels of membership participation in union affairs (pp. 208-
10). 38 The authors fail to note the findings of another study, however, 
33. Freeman and Medoff note, for example, that most union corruption is confined to a small 
handful of unions. Pp. 216-17. They fail to point out, however, that one of those unions- the 
Teamsters - alone represents nearly ten percent of the unionized, private sector workforce. 
DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, 1982-83 EDITION 2-3 (C. Gifford ed. 1982). For a 
recent analysis of the extent and nature of union corruption in this country, see PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND LABOR 
(1986). 
34. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 
323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 
64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980). 
35. See, e.g., Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Represelllatiim: The Dichotomy Between Nego-
tiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. Iu .. L.F. 35, 43; VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model 
for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983). 
36. E.g., Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the 
Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. ToL. L. REV. 514 (1974). 
37. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do /11 Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 89, 96 (1985). My study found that plaintiffs prevail in fewer than five percent of the duty 
of fair representation cases they file, in part because such procedural obstacles as a short limita-
tions period and common requirements that internal union remedies be exhausted preclude plain-
tiffs from obtaining a hearing on the merits of their claims in approximately 45% of the cases. 
Id. 
38. For example, the data indicate that within a two-year period, 76% of the union members 
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which indicates that self-reported participation in union affairs is fre-
quently exaggerated and is more reliable as a psychological, rather 
than a behavioral, variable. 39 
Leadership turnover is another factor Freeman and Medoff use to 
measure the extent of democracy in the labor movement, and they are 
correct that turnover rates are relatively high at the local level (p. 
211). They are unable to tell us, however, the extent to which this 
turnover results from successful challenges to incumbents (or their 
designated successors), on the one hand, or merely from the retire-
ments or deaths of the prior officeholders, on the other. In any event, 
bargaining, and in some unions even final resolution of grievances, 40 is 
frequently controlled by the national leadership,41 and at that level, as 
Freeman and Medoff acknowledge, officer turnover is lower (p. 211). 
Moreover, even what turnover occurs at the national level is typi-
cally far removed from membership control. For example, most un-
ions elect their top officials by votes of conventfon delegates (who 
themselves are usually officeholders at some level of the union hierar-
chy) rather than by membership referenda.42 In addition: 
The filling of unscheduled vacancies in the top post often plays a key role 
in the continuity of an administration's power. In the large majority of 
our American unions, either the executive council appoints a successor 
until the expiration of the term of office, or a specified national officer 
takes over for this period .... [T]he new or acting president may be very 
well entrenched by the time of the next presidential election.43 
surveyed had attended a union meeting; 73% had voted in a union election; and 16% had been 
nominated for, elected to, or appointed to a union office. P. 209. These figures, from the 1977 
Quality of Employment Survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan, seem especially high in light of the fact that local officers are typically elected for 
three-year terms, and national officers for five-year terms. If the elections and offices referred to 
in the survey include such lower level union positions as shop stewards and membership on 
various union committees (that information is not provided), the figures s~em more reasonable. 
39. Strauss, Union Government in the U.S.: Research Past and Future, 16 INDUS. REL. 215, 
224 (1977). Other studies have indicated that union members are less likely to participate in 
union affairs when they perceive the union as satisfying their needs. Anderson, Local Union 
Participation: A Re-examination, 18 INDUS. REL. 18, 26 (1979). This raises the possibility that 
the survey data relied upon by Freeman and Medoff overstate either the level of membership 
participation in union affairs or the level of members' satisfaction with their unions' performance. 
40. See, e.g., art. 8, § l(a), National Master Freight Agreement (between the Teamsters 
union and most unionized trucking companies, adopted April 1985). 
41. See, e.g., J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY: ORGANI-
SATION AND OPPOSITION JN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS 20-21 (1975); Roomkin, Union 
Structure, Internal Control and Strike Activity, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 198, 199 (1976). 
42. D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DE-
MOCRACY 24 (1979). For a discussion of the impact of this system on the level of democracy in 
the Teamsters union, see Goldberg, Teamsters: More Oligarchy Than Democracy, Philadelphia 
Inquirer, May 23, 1983, at 11-A, col. 1. 
43. J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, supra note 41, at 101-02. This scenario is by no means 
uncommon, as illustrated by the recent mid-term changes in leadership in three of the largest and 
most important national unions, the Teamsters, Steelworkers, and AFSCME (public employees). 
Serrin, Ohio Leader Named Teamsters' Chief. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1983, at A20, col. I; Serrin, 
Strategist at Helm of Public Employee Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1981, at 32, col. 2; Steelwork-
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Indeed, the incumbents' overwhelming advantages in contested cam-
paigns for national union office have been well documented.44 
The most serious flaw in Freeman and Medoff's treatment of inter-
nal union affairs is their facile assumption that all union elections not 
successfully challenged by the Department of Labor pursuant to Title 
IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act45 are untainted by improper practices 
(pp. 211-12). In fact, Title !V's enforcement procedures are too cum-
bersome and the Department of Labor's enforcement efforts too pas-
sive to justify such a conclusion. The Act vests nearly exclusive 
authority in the Secretary of Labor to enforce Title'IV,46 and grants to 
the Secretary broad prosecutorial discretion in deciding when to exer-
cise that authority.47 Unfortunately, the Secretary's enforcement re-
sponsibilities are often at odds with his roles as industrial peacemaker 
and Administration liaison with organized labor. As a result, political 
considerations frequently influence decisions not to prosecute apparent 
violations. 48 
Moreover, in many cases the Labor Department may be willing 
but unable to prosecute, for a number of reasons. For example, en-
forcement efforts begin only when a union member, after exhausting 
internal union remedies, files a complaint with the Department alleg-
ers' Secretary in Charge Ulltil Union Election on March 29, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at D18, 
col. 6. 
44. See generally James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in 
National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247 (1978) (pointing out that "non-elite 
[rank and file] challenges to national union officials are rarely successful even with federal legisla-
tion regulating union elections"). 
45. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) §§ 401-403, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1982). Title IV requires, inter alia: (1) elections of specified union officers at 
regular intervals; (2) the eligibility of all members in good standing to run for office, subject to 
"reasonable qualifications, uniformly imposed"; (3) reasonable opportunities for every member to 
nominate candidates for office; (4) equal opportunities for all candidates to distribute campaign 
literature (at their own expense) through use of union membership lists; and (5) fair procedures 
for casting and counting votes, including the use of the secret ballot. In addition, all candidates 
are prohibited from using union or employer funds or resources in their campaigns. For a com-
prehensive discussion of Title IV's substantive provisions, see Levy, Electing Union Officers 
Under the LMRDA, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1984). 
46. See LMRDA §§ 402(b), 403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(b), 483 (1982). There are two principal 
exceptions to the Secretary's otherwise exclusive power to remedy election violations. First, Title 
IV permits candidates to bring preelection suits to enforce their reasonable requests concerning 
the mailing of campaign literature. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c). Second, members 
may seek preelection relief for certain election-related violations of Title I of the Act (e.g., dis-
criminatory application of eligibility requirements), LMRDA §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415. 
Cf Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 550 (1984) ("If the 
remedy sought [for violation of Title I] is invalidation of the election already being conducted 
with court supervision of a new election, then union members must utilize the remedies provided 
by Title IV."). 
47. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
48. See D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 48-50; James, supra note 44, 
at 294-313; Rauh, LMRDA-E11force It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L. REV. 643 (1971); Note, Union 
Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 499-504, 512 
(1972). 
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ing election irregularities.49 If the complainant fails to exhaust inter-
nal remedies - perhaps due to missing a short filing deadline50 - the 
Department is unable to proceed no matter how serious the alleged 
violation. Similarly, many election-related violatio',ns are never prose-
cuted because the Landrum-Griffin Act requires a finding that a viola-
tion "may have affected the outcome of an election" before relief may 
be granted.51 As one critic of this policy explained: 
The final irony is that the greater the damage, the greater the margin of 
the incumbent's victory, and the harder it is to ever convince the Secre-
tary that the violations "may have affected the outcome." Thus, there is 
reason to advise an incumbent that if he is going to violate Title IV, he 
should violate it early and often. 52 
My problem with Freeman and Medoff's treatment of internal 
union affairs goes beyond its dependence upon unreliable indicators of 
union democracy. The authors appear completely insensitive to the 
fact that, as "one-party states," unions are inherently prone to oligar-
chy unless special care is taken to maintain and promote democratic 
processes. 53 Much of Freeman and Medoff's favorable analysis of the 
collective voice face of unionism rests on the "[g]iven that union deci-
sions are based on a political process in which the majority rules" (p. 
16). But as an important article by Alan Hyde has demonstrated, 
union decisions in collective bargaining - which for Freeman and 
Medoff's purposes are the union decisions of greatest significance -
are quite often made without extensive or meaningful rank and file 
input.54 Indeed, a substantial proportion of unionized employees have 
no right to vote on the collective bargaining agreements governing 
their jobs,55 and those that do often find that right difficult to 
enforce.56 
49. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982). Section 601(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 521(a), authorizes the Secretary to investigate suspected pree!ection violations even without a 
union member's formal complaint, but as a general rule that power is not exercised. See D. 
McLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 56-58. 
50. In the Teamsters union, for instance, election protests must be filed within 72 hours of 
the election. INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, CONSTITUTION art. XXII, § 5(b) (adopted 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
TEAMSTERS CONSTITUTION]. For an excellent discussion of the obstacles to effective Title IV 
enforcement from the perspective of rank and file unionists, see H. BENSON, DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS: A GUIDE TO INTERNAL UNION DEMOCRACY 69-122 (1979). 
51. LMRDA § 402(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982). See D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. 
SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 61-62. For an interpretation of this provision that would permit 
more aggressive enforcement by the Department of Labor, see Summers, Democracy i11 a 011e-
Party State: Perspectives from La11drum-Griffi11, 43 Mo. L. REV. 93, 112-13 (1984). 
52. James, supra note 44, at 304. 
53. See generally Summers, supra note 51 (illustrating how the Landrum-Griffin Act has 
been, and should be, construed to meet the special need to provide democracy in a one-party 
system). 
54. Hyde, Democracy i11 Collective Bargai11i11g, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984). 
55. Id. at 805. 
56. Id. at 810-19. Even when employees can vote on their contracts, the outcome is not 
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Freeman and Medoff's superficial and uncritical treatment of in-
ternal union affairs is not unusual among supporters of the American 
labor movement, many of whom believe that public exposure of union 
corruption and autocracy can only play into the hands of the labor 
movement's opponents.57 In my view, anti-union forces will continue 
to exploit these shortcomings whether or not supporters of the labor 
movement choose to confront them directly. Indeed, it is only by ac-
knowledging and working toward the elimination of these problems 
that the labor movement will be able to prevent their further exploita-
tion by anti-union forces. Freeman and Medoff would have done well 
to heed the advice of Herman Benson, the executive director of the 
Association for Union Democracy: 
What we are talking about here is the great paradoxical character of the 
American labor movement: on the outside, it is the force for democracy, 
social justice and human freedom; but on the inside, it tends to be auto-
cratic. These are the two different sides of the American labor move-
ment. One cannot ignore the realities on the inside, by pointing to the 
great things that unions are accomplishing on the outside. There is no 
reason for those of us who support the American labor movement to fall 
into that trap. 58 
III 
The shortcomings I have just described are serious, but they 
should not be blown out of proportion. Most of them are confined to 
only one of the sixteen chapters that comprise What Do Unions Do?, 
and it may be no coincidence that that chapter is the only one not 
based at least in part on earlier work by Freeman or Medoff. 59 In fact, 
one of the book's strengths is precisely that most of it does draw heav-
ily on earlier articles by the authors and a number of their collabora-
tors. As a result, many of its arguments and much of the supporting 
data have been carefully reevaluated and refined over time. 
What Do Unions Do? will undoubtedly have a significant impact 
on labor law scholarship in coming years. Indeed, it is already evident 
that scholars purporting to bring economic analysis to bear on labor 
law issues must at least acknowledge and respond to the book's treat-
ment of unions, even if they choose not to embrace it fully. A recent 
always decided by simple majority rule. In the Teamsters, for example, an employer's final offer 
can only be rejected by a two-thirds vote of the membership. TEAMSTERS CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 50, art. XII, § 1 (b ), art. XVI, sec. 4(b ). 
57. See, e.g., Goldberg, A Trade-Union Point of View, in LABOR IN A FREE SOCIETY 102 (M. 
Harrington & P. Jacobs eds. 1959); Wyle, Landrum-Griffin: A Wrong Step in a Dangerous Direc-
tion, 13 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 395 (1960). 
58. Benson, Union Democracy and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 153, 184 (1982-83). 
59. One wonders whether the chapter was a last minute addition pulled together after the 
authors realized that their book would be incomplete without a discussion of internal union 
affairs. 
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analysis of labor bargaining units, for example, posits three economic 
models of union activity and then examines the relationship between 
each of those models and the criteria developed by the NLRB for de-
termining appropriate bargaining units under the National Labor Re-
lations Act. 60 One of the three models examined is Freeman and 
Medoff's. 61 This is a significant advance over an earlier article by the 
same author, which expressly declined to examine "various theories 
that challenge the traditional model by suggesting that some union 
activity enhances productivity."62 Even Richard Posner, a strong ad-
herent of the price-auction model of labor markets63 and the tradi-
tional monopoly view of unions, recognizes the need to respond to 
Freeman and Medoff's very different approach. 64 
Economics aside, What Do Unions Do? also serves as a timely re-
minder to labor law scholars that empirical research can play an im-
portant role in complementing the doctrinal and theoretical work 
more commonly pursued by legal academics. 65 For example, one of 
the great strengths of Paul Weller's recent proposals for the funda-
mental reform of the National Labor Relations Act is that they are 
soundly rooted in an extensive record of empirical evidence - much 
of which was initially collected or analyzed by Freeman and Medoff -
documenting both the failure of the present statutory scheme and the 
likely ineffectiveness of less drastic reform alternatives. 66 
Indeed, even readers who disagree with Freeman and Medoff's 
analysis will undoubtedly find their book an invaluable source of data 
- assuming, of course, that such readers have an interest in reality 
that goes beyond "some theoretical construct the real world has yet to 
witness" (p. 247). To those who do not,67 the book provides a useful 
60. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984). 
61. Id. at 354-60. 
62. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1185 n.8 (1980). 
63. For a critique of that model, see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF 
ECONOMICS 173-215 (1983). 
64. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1000-01. 
65. For more explicit discussions of the importance of empirical research in labor law, see 
Dworkin & DeNisi, Empirical Research in Labor Relations Law: A Review, Some Problems, and 
Some Directions for Future Research, 28 LAB. L.J. 563 (1977); Empirical Data and Statistical 
Analysis in Labor Law, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
66. Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 28 (proposing that representation elections be held 
immediately upon a union's presentation of authorization cards demonstrating substantial em-
ployee interest, thereby minimizing employer opportunities to interfere illegally with union or-
ganizing efforts); Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 28 (proposing arbitration of the first 
collective agreement for newly organized workers as a remedy for egregious bad-faith bargaining, 
and proposing that prohibitions against secondary boycotts in bargaining disputes be partially 
lifted). Weiler's work also includes a short but effective defense brief on behalf of collective 
bargaining which draws heavily upon the economic research of Freeman and Medoff. Weiler, 
Promises to Keep, supra note 28, at 1823-27. 
67. See, e.g., Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); 
Epstein, supra note 8 (both arguing on libertarian and efficiency grounds for deregulation of the 
employment relationship). For commentary on these articles highlighting Epstein's failure to 
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antidote. 
On the other hand, the limitations of empirical research must be 
recognized. As Freeman and Medoff succinctly put it, "Age-old de-
bates do not often end with a bang, even with computerized evidence" 
(p. 180).68 To be sure, What Do Unions Dof is a major achievement, 
and its findings provide support~rs of the labor movement with the 
facts and figures they need to respond to the oft-repeated claim that 
unions are a drag on the economy that society can no longer afford. 
But in the end, the strongest case for unionism has never been that 
unions pay for themselves. Efficiency is not the only value in the em-
ployment relationship, and to give it too much weight is to allow the 
proponents of the law and economics movement to monopolize the 
debate over the future of American labor law. 69 
Freeman and Medoff's greatest achievement is in identifying the 
features of unionism's collective voice face; their effort to quantify the 
value of those features is in my view less successful but also less impor-
tant. After all, unions at their best seek to bring to the workplace not 
only improved wages and working conditions but a model of industrial 
democracy and human dignity that is impossible to measure in dollars 
and cents. Thus, suggestions that workers would be just as well off 
under a system that established decent standards of employment 
through social legislation alone, without collective bargaining, 70 over-
look completely the value of enabling workers to participate collec-
tively and effectively in the decisions controlling their working lives. 
Equally important, unions provide a collective voice to workers 
address the empirical and historical evidence contradicting his argument, see Finkin, ''In Defense 
of the Comract at Will"-Some Discussion Comments and Questions, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 727 
(1985); Getman & Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor 
Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983); Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Relations?, 92 YALE 
L.J. 1409 (1983). 
68. Certainly the authors of Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality, one of the 
best-known and most controversial empirical studies in labor law, would agree with this state-
ment. See J. GETMAN, s. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: 
LAW AND REALITY (1976). Ten years after publication of their study, the debate still rages over 
the validity of its conclusions. Compare Dickens, The Effects of Company Campaigns on Certifi-
cation Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 560 (1983); Free-
man & Medoff, pp. 236-37; and Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 28, at 1782-86, with 
Goldberg, Getman & Brett, The Relationship Between Free Choice and Labor Board Doctrine: 
Differing Empirical Approaches, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 721 (1984). 
69. Cf. Peritz, The Predicamellt of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopoliza-
tion of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205 (describing and criticizing the dom-
ination of one aspect of antitrust analysis by the law and economics approach). The literature 
critiquing the law and economics movement is extensive. See, e.g., Baker, Starting Points in 
Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939 (1980); Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: 
Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980); Horwitz, Law and Eco-
nomics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: 
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: 
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985). 
70. See, e.g., Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the 
Curre/lt State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012 (1984). 
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not only in the workplace, but in the political arena as well (pp. 191-
206). Along with the civil rights movement, the labor movement is 
the most important and best organized segment of the polity that has 
struggled consistently for a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
power in this society. True, the traditions of bread and butter union-
ism in this country are a far cry from the political unionism of western 
Europe, 71 but as one commentator has put it: "The AFL-CIO may be 
... relatively weak and relatively nonideological ... , but there is no 
doubt that in its absence the pressures by corporations and affluent 
individuals to widen tax privileges still further, extract government 
subsidies, and assist the unneedy, would be entirely successful, instead 
of only mostly successful."72 
71. See generally European Labor and Politics (pts. 1 & 2), 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 
203 (1974-75). 
72. R. LEKACHMAN, ECONOMISTS AT BAY 204 (1976). 
